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Circumventing Sullivan: An Argument
Against Awarding Punitive Damages
for Newsgathering Torts
Tracy Dreispul*
"[Wjithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated." 1
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "seeking
out the news" warrants First Amendment protection.2 However,
the Court has never defined what First Amendment protections
apply to newsgathering or how broadly these protections extend.
In cases in which the press has sought protection for newsgathering,
the United States Supreme Court has instead rested on the
proposition that generally applicable laws do not violate the First
Amendment simply because they burden the press's ability to seek
out and gather the news.3  This conflict recently gained national
attention in the case of Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.4
I. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
In 1992, Lynne Litt and Susan Barnett, two producers of
ABC's PrimeTime Live news program, used false identities and
falsified employment applications in order to obtain employment
at separate Food Lion grocery stores.' Litt and Barnett sought
information for a news story on reputed unsanitary practices by
* The author would like to thank Dr. Bill Chamberlin and Angela Izzo-Peppe for their
assistance with this Article.
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
2. Id. at 681 ("We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated."); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979) (offering protection for "routine newspaper reporting techniques").
3. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
4. 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
5. See id. at 816.
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Food Lion.6 Both were subsequently employed;7 Litt as a meat
wrapper8 and Barnett as a deli clerk.9
During their employment, Litt and Barnett used hidden
cameras and audio recording devices to obtain information for the
news story that aired November 5, 1992, on the ABC network. 10
The story included revelations by former Food Lion employees and
five to six minutes of hidden camera footage obtained by Litt and
Barnette.1 The former Food Lion employees revealed practices
of grinding rotten pork into sausage,12 climbing into dumpsters to
retrieve food, 3 and rinsing ham and spoiled fish with bleach in
order to "take the smell out."14 Hidden camera footage showed
one Food Lion manager making what he called "conversions" by
cutting spoiled edges off of old pork chops and subsequently
repackaging and relabeling them as fresh.15 Other employees
were shown incorporating out-of-date ground beef with fresh
ground beef, repackaging old fish and relabeling it as fresh, and
transforming Country Pride brand chicken that had past its
expiration date into a new "gourmet" selection by placing barbecue
sauce on it and selling it as fresh food.16
The Food Lion story reached a larger viewing audience than
any prior PrimeTime Live program. 7 Food Lion suffered dramat-
6. See id. at 814-16.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 816.
9. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 816.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Hidden Cameras, Hard Choices: ABC PrimeTime Live (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 12, 1997) (hereinafter PrimeTime Live) ("They take that pork that's already
starting to get a slime to it ... and they take and put that in the grinder with sausage
mixture and they put it back out for anywhere from 7 to 10 days as fresh homemade
sausage-and it's rotten.").
13. See id. (Employee: "I've seen them in the dumpster, not just leaning over in-
to ... climb in it .. . I mean be up in it." Diane Sawyer: "And taking out what kinds of
things?" Employee: "Just take a head of cauliflower for instance, to where its just got black
little spots over the top of it and they'd bring it back in ... they'd want you to take a like
a brillo pad-type-thing and scrub to-get the little black stuff off, and stick it back in the tray
and reduce it, and try to get something for it.").
14. Id.
15. Id. (showing Food Lion Market Manager display pork chops and say, "These are
conversions-they look just as good as fresh.").
16. See id.
17. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 12.
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ic losses as a result of the broadcast."8 Immediately after the
broadcast, Food Lion's retail sales dropped, and within days, the
value of Food Lion's stock fell significantly. 9 By 1993, Food
Lion's annual profits had plummeted from $178 million to $3.9
million.2"
Food Lion sued ABC.21  In a forty-seven page complaint,
Food Lion alleged claims of intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, trespass, civil conspiracy, violations of federal wiretapping
statutes, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), negligent supervision, respondeat
superior liability, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud,
and unfair and deceptive trade practices. 22  Noticeably missing
from the list of grievances was libel.
Food Lion won on the claims of trespass, fraud, and breach of
fiduciary duty and proved $1,402 in actual damages. 23 Because
Food Lion failed to allege and subsequently prove actual malice,
the standard necessary to prove defamation under New York Times
v. Sullivan,24 Food Lion was not able to recover for damages to its
reputation-including lost profits and securities value.2 ' Despite
the fact that Food Lion proved only $1,402 in actual damages and
that the material contained in the news story was presumed to be
true under the law,26 the jury awarded Food Lion more than 5.5
18. See id.; see also Scott Andron, Food Lion Roaring Back, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, Feb. 16, 1997, at El, avialable in 1997 WL 4572293 (discussing Food Lion's losses
following the broadcast and Food Lion's recent economic comeback).
19. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 816 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
20. See Andron, supra note 18.
21. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 812-13. Food Lion named as defendants: Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., ABC Holding Co., Lynne Lit, Richard N. Kaplan, Ira Rosen, and Susan
Barnett. Richard N. Kaplan was PrimeTime Live's executive producer, and Ira Rosen was
PrimeTime Live's senior producer during the time relevant to the case. See id. at 813.
22. See id.
23. See Scott Huler, Food Lion Awarded Punitive Damages, THE NEWS & OBSERVER-
RALEIGH, NC., Jan. 23, 1997, at Al.
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also infra text accompanying notes 49-51 (discussing "actual
malice" requirement).
25. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 823 (following United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
26. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262 (placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff).
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million dollars in punitive damages.27 A federal court later
remitted the punitive damages to $315,000.8
This Article examines the problem of applying punitive
damages to newsgathering torts from a constitutional perspec-
tive." The Article provides a brief overview of the conflict be-
tween tort liability and the freedom of the press, followed by a
discussion of the constitutional concerns raised by punitive damage
awards. This Article then explores the unique problems incurred
by awarding punitive damages for newsgathering torts. Finally, this
Article argues that punitive damages unjustifiably burden the free
exercise of the press when applied to newsgathering torts.
II. General Principles
"Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a
vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in
redressing wrongful injury."3°
In order to protect the "vigorous and uninhibited" exercise of
the press, the United States Supreme Court has limited damages
that a plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by the publication
of truthful material.3 ' General tort law principles provide causes
of action for defamation32, publication of private facts33 , and
publication of injurious falsehood.34 However, when these or
27. See Huler, supra note 23.
28. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 940 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
29. While this article will address the general conflict between tort principles and
freedom of the press, the arguments within this paper focus specifically on the issue of
punitive damages. For a thorough overview of newsgathering tort liability, see Symposium,
Undercover Newsgathering Techniques: Issues and Concerns, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1111 (1996)
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
31. See, e.g., id.; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. See BLACK'S LAW DIMrlONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990) (defining defamation, in pertinent
part, as "[a]n intentional false communication, either published or publicly spoken, that
injures another's reputation or good name.").
33. See id. 1195 (defining "public disclosure of private facts" as one of four general
classes of tort actions for invasion of privacy "consisting of a cause of action in publicity, of
a highly objectionable kind, given to private information about the plaintiff, even though it
is true and no action would lie for defamation.").
34. Publication of injurious falsehood is defined as:
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for publication
of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary
value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he
[Vol. 103:1
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similar tort actions are brought against the press, tort principles
must be balanced against the First Amendment rights of free
speech and freedom of the press.35
A. Publication
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan36 the United States
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment limits the liability
that a state may impose upon a publisher for statements regarding
public officials.37 In 1960, the New York Times published a
political advertisement accusing unnamed government officials in
Montgomery, Alabama of using violence and intimidation to
suppress the civil rights movement. 38 L.B. Sullivan, the Montgom-
ery Commissioner who supervised the police department, sued the
New York Times for libel, alleging that the publication referred to
him, and defamed him.39
Under Alabama law, any publication that "'tend[ed] to injure
a person ... in his reputation,' or to 'bring [him] into public
contempt"' was considered "libelous per se."4 Therefore, Sullivan
only had to prove that the statements were published by the
defendant, and were made "of and concerning" Sullivan.41 The
defendant could avoid liability by proving the truth of the pub-
lished statements; however, if the defendant did not prove the
statements' truth, damages were presumed and could be awarded
without out proof of actual injury.42
The United States Supreme Court held that the Alabama libel
law violated the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment.43 The Sullivan Court feared the potential chilling
knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1979).
35. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. See id. at 264 (holding that First and Fourteenth Amendments require "safeguards
for freedom of speech and of the press ... in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct.").
38. See id. at 256.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 267.
41. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 279 (holding the law violated the First Amendment, as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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effect' imposed by any law that placed the burden of proving the
truth of an allegedly libelous statement on the publisher.45 The
Sullivan Court recognized that "erroneous statement is inevitable
in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to
survive.'46 Requiring a publisher to prove the truth of its state-
ments imposed too high a burden on a publisher, and would lead
to unacceptable self-censorship by the media.47
Because First Amendment protection of political criticism is a
"fundamental principle of our constitutional system, 48 the
Sullivan Court formulated a rule designed to encourage "uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. 49  The Court
held that a public official seeking damages for a statement made
about his or her public acts must pass a stringent two-part test to
prove libel.5" First, the public official must show that the state-
ment was false.51 Second, the public official must prove that the
publisher acted with actual malice, meaning that the publisher acted
"with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless
44. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 240 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "chilling effect" as
"[t]he deterrent effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct prohibition against
the exercise of First Amendment rights. To constitute a chilling effect the constrictive impact
must arise from the present or future exercise or threatened exercise of coercive power.").
45. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974) ("In our continuing effort to define the proper accommodation between these
competing concerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech
and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise.") (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
46. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72. The court went on to state that "[a] rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual asser-
tions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to . . . 'self-censorship."' Id. at 279.
47. See id. at 278.
48. Id. at 269. "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system." (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
49. Id. at 270.
50. Id. at 279-80; see also Gertz at 340-41 (reaffirming principle that although "neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues," lies or errors are "nevertheless inevitable
in free debate.") (citations omitted).
51. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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disregard of whether it was false or not." 2 This two-part test is
commonly known as the "Sullivan test."
By contrast, if a private individual53 sues for libel, the First
Amendment requires a lesser showing of proof than would be
required from a public official. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"
the United States Supreme Court concluded that the state interest
in compensating a private individual for unjustified reputational
damage weighs against First Amendment interests that apply in
matters concerning public officials.55 This state interest is limited
only by the fact that the First Amendment prohibits any state from
imposing liability without fault.56 In other words, a state may
impose damages for libel of a private individual without requiring
that the plaintiff prove actual malice; a lesser negligence or
recklessness standard suffices.57
However, the Gertz Court strictly limited the damages
available to private citizens who prevail under a standard less
stringent than the Sullivan test.58 Whereas under traditional libel
law, a plaintiff could recover presumed
59 and punitive damages,60
the Gertz Court explicitly prohibited both of these forms of
52. Id. at 280.
53. Private individual in this sense means any person that is neither a public official
acting in an official capacity nor a public figure as defined by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court in Butts expanded the Sullivan test to apply to statements
regarding public figures. See id. at 155. Butts defines "public figure" as a person who is of
general public interest because of their status or position, or a person who has thrust himself
"into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Id. at 155. For the purposes of this
paper, no analytical distinctions are made between "public figures" and "public officials."
54. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
55. See id. at 341 ("The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media ... is not the
only societal value at issue .... The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is
the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted upon them by defamatory
falsehood.").
56. See id. at 347 (holding that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.").
57. See id. This holding ended the common law practice of applying strict liability for
defamation and required at least proof of negligence in regard to falsity in order to find
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt d. (1979); see also Gertz, 418
U.S. at 340 ("Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable
self-censorship.").
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
59. Under traditional libel law, injuries were presumed to flow from the publication of
a false statement. See id. at 349. Thus, presumed damages could be awarded even where
the plaintiff offered no proof of actual injury. See id.
60. See id.; see also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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damages. 6' Instead, the Gertz Court determined that, in those
cases in which actual malice is not established, awarding libel
damages above the amount of actual injury would significantly
impair First Amendment freedoms. 62  "The largely uncontrolled
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no [actual] loss
unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for
defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First
Amendment freedoms."63 Furthermore, the Court held that states
have "no substantial interest" in awarding plaintiffs damages in
excess of actual injury.6  Therefore, a private individual who




Unlike publication, newsgathering does not have well-defined
standards of protection under the First Amendment. Despite the
Supreme Court's lofty assertions of newsgathering's constitutional
status, 66 the Court has hesitated to extend the freedom of the
press to protect newsgathering.67 The Court has instead drawn a
hazy line between the publication and the gathering of the news.
68




65. See id. at 328. ("[We recognize] the strong and legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation .... But this countervailing
[against the First Amendment] state interest extends no further than compensation for actual
injury.").
66. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
67. Although the Court has recognized a First Amendment interest in newsgathering,
this First Amendment interest has paled in comparison to the countervailing state interest
involved in those cases in which newsgathering has conflicted with general tort principles.
See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 665
(1972); cf. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 American
Bar Foundation Research Journal 521, 592 (1977) ("Mr. Justice White's majority opinion [in
Branzburg] acknowledged that the act of newsgathering is 'not without its First Amendment
protection,' but the Court rejected all of the privilege claims presented .... and appeared
to accord no more than intermediate importance to the First Amendment interests at issue."
(footnote omitted)). Blasi argues that recognition of the "watchdog function" that the press
serves over public officials might lead to heightened protection for newsgathering activities.
See id. at 591-611. Blasi, however, would not exempt newsgathering functions from generally
applicable laws. See id. at 611. But see Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980) (granting press right to attend criminal trial).
68. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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The United States Supreme Court first examined whether
newsgathering warrants constitutional protection in Branzburg v.
Hayes.69 In Branzburg, the Court questioned whether the First
Amendment grants reporters a limited privilege not to reveal
sources of information before a grand jury.7" Despite the Branz-
burg Court's reassurance that "it [is not] suggested that newsgather-
ing does not qualify for First Amendment protection"; the United
States Supreme Court denied the privilege." The Court dismissed
the proposition that forcing reporters to reveal sources to grand
juries would undermine reporters' ability to gain confidential
information.72 Instead, the Court held that the state interest in
fair and effective law enforcement outweighed whatever burden the
inability to keep confidential information might have on the
press.73
Similarly, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.," the Court held
that generally applicable laws-laws that apply to all citizens and
do not single out the press-do not violate the First Amendment
when a law's enforcement has only an incidental effect on the
press's ability to gather and report the news.75 In Cohen, a
confidential informant sued a newspaper on a promissory estoppel
theory after the paper violated a confidentiality agreement and
published the informant's name.76 The newspaper argued that the
First Amendment barred the lawsuit under the theory that a state
may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained information
without showing a state interest "of the highest order., 77  The
United States Supreme Court rejected this argument. 78 The Court
held that the controlling issue in the case was not whether the state
could punish the publication, but whether the defendants would be
69. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
70. See id. at 667.
71. Id. at 681.
72. See id. at 682-88; see also Blasi, supra note 67, at 592 ("The Court's failure in
Branzburg to give more weight to the newsgathering interest can be ascribed in part to
skepticism over whether a testimonial privilege would have much affect on the newsgathering
capabilities of journalists.") (footnote omitted).
73. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 (holding that the state interest outweighed the
"consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering" that would be cause by forcing
reporters to reveal confidential sources to grand jury inquests).
74. 501 U.S. 663 (1992).
75. See id. at 672.
76. See id. at 666.
77. Id. at 668-69 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
78. See id. at 669.
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exempt from contract or tort liability because their otherwise
tortious actions occurred while newsgathering.79
The Cohen case exemplifies the distinction between the
protections afforded to newsgathering and publication under
current First Amendment jurisprudence. In Cohen, the Court did
not refute the defendant's assertion that the publication warranted
protection.8" Instead, the Court recognized that the newsgathering
activity, and not the publication itself, was the focus of the
plaintiff's claim.8" By failing to attribute to newsgathering the
constitutional protection afforded to publication, the Court was
able to cast aside the defendant's First Amendment interests.
Thus, the Cohen Court augmented a long list of cases supporting
the proposition that the media "has no special immunity from the
application of general laws.,
82
In the principal case in which the Supreme Court established
a form of newsgathering protection, the Court was unable to form
a majority opinion supporting the theory behind that protection.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,83 the Court held that,
absent a showing that access to the trial would prejudice the
defendant, the First Amendment guarantees the press 84 the right
79. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (stating that "the publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others.") (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1946)).
80. See id. at 669.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 132-33 (1946)). The
decision in Cohen was consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent that the First
Amendment does not prevent the application of generally applicable laws to newsgathering.
See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
581 (1983) (recognizing that newspapers can be subjected to "generally applicable economic
regulations without creating constitutional problems."); Zacchini v. Schripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the press must respect copyright laws);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("It is clear that the First Amendment does
not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement
of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability."); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (holding that the Fair Labor Standard Act applies to the
business of publishing and distributing newspapers); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that applying the Sherman Act to publishers does not abridge freedom
of the press).
83. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
84. See id. at 572-73. (The Court attributed to the press the function as the people's
surrogate in this sense: "Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand
observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly
through the electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as
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to attend criminal trials.85 As Justice Steven's concurring opinion
notes, Richmond Newspapers was the first case in which the Court
"squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled
to any constitutional protection whatsoever.
' 86
Unfortunately, the establishment of explicit newsgathering
protection failed to command a majority of the Court.87 Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens, delivered an
opinion noting that Branzburg had promised protection for
newsgathering. 8  The opinion did not, however, commit this
protection to cover the present issue. Instead, the Chief Justice
determined only that the right to observe a criminal trial was
guaranteed by the First Amendment, while explicitly declining to
decide whether this right should fall under the category of a "right
of access,"89 or a newsgathering privilege.9"
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in an
opinion that draws less of a distinction between rights-of-access and
newsgathering privileges. In fact, the opinion seems to merge the
two issues, almost including a newsgathering privilege within a right
of access: "The Court's approach in right-of-access cases simply
reflects the special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to
gather information."'" Thus, Richmond Newspapers, while
protecting newsgathering on First Amendment grounds, fails again
to define where newsgathering belongs within First Amendment
jurisprudence.
surrogates for the public.").
85. See id. at 581.
86. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion joined by Justices White and Stevens. See
id. at 558-81. Justice White and Justice Stevens each issued concurring opinions. See id. at
581-84. Justice Brennan issued an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice
Marshall joined. See id. at 584-98. Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun each issued
concurring opinions. See id. at 598-604. Justice Rhenquist dissented. See id. at 604-06.
Justice Powell did not participate in the case.
88. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.
89. See id. at 575-76 ("[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.") (quoting First National Bank
of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
90. See id. at 576 ("It is not crucial whether we describe this right ... as a 'right of
access' . . . or a 'right to gather information,' for we have recognized that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.:') (citations
omitted).
91. Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1998]
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Branzburg, Cohen, and Richmond Newspapers reveal an
ambiguity in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence about the
status of newsgathering under the First Amendment. The Court
has stated that newsgathering warrants First Amendment protec-
tion; yet the Court has repeatedly hesitated to extend this protec-
tion to shield the press from generally applicable laws. While
Richmond Newspapers protects newsgathering activity, the case fails
to provide a theoretical framework in which to place newsgathering
under the First Amendment.
III. Newsgathering, Torts, and the First Amendment
"A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance
of government to supply it with information."'
A. A "Glorious History"
Undercover newsgathering techniques similar to those used in
the Food Lion case have been used by the print media in the
United States for over a century.93 Similarly, the television media
have been using undercover newsgathering techniques for almost
thirty-five years.
In 1963, the television program CBS Reports used hidden
cameras to expose a "bookie joint" in Boston.94 PrimeTime Live,
the defendants in the Food Lion case, has routinely used undercov-
er newsgathering techniques since 1989.95 Interestingly, Prime-
Time Live's early investigative reports involved stories similar to
those written by Nellie Bly and Upton Sinclair. In 1989, two ABC
producers posed as mentally ill patients to uncover abuses in a
board and care home in Texas; in 1992, ABC reporters posed as
employees in a meat-packing plant to investigate unsanitary
92. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
93. Famous examples include NEW YORK WORLD reporter Nellie Bly, who in 1877
posed as a mentally ill patient to uncover the horrors of a New York City insane asylum.
See Alf Pratte, Sometimes Subterfuge by Journalists Needed to Get Story, THE SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 1997; see also Nellie Bly: Daredevil, Reporter, Feminist, PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY, January 10, 1994 Vol. 241, No. 2., at 50 (Book Review), available in 1994 WL
1348336 (regarding Bly as a pioneer among women journalists). Upton Sinclair, who's 1906
book THE JUNGLE exposed substandard conditions in the meat-packing industry, is another
example. See Clarence Page, Undercover Reporting on Food Lion: ABC Was Right, THE
RECORD, Feb. 3, 1997, at A15.
94. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 12.




conditions in the industry.96  Additionally, PrimeTime Live
reporters have used hidden cameras, false identities, and similar
deceptive practices to unveil neglect in veterans hospitals, abuse in
day care centers, medicare fraud, and improper activities by
members of Congress.97
Public support for undercover newsgathering practices has
changed over the years. In 1963, the CBS report entitled "Biogra-
phy of a Bookie Joint" won critical acclaim.98 However, as
journalist Clarence Page notes, public support for undercover
newsgathering practices began to fade in 1978, when a similar
"sting" operation set up by the Chicago Sun-Times and 60 Minutes
of CBS received public criticism, rather than commendation.99
Today, public opinion is almost evenly divided on the issue. A
national survey taken shortly after the Food Lion verdict reveals
that about half of Americans who had heard of the case supported
the undercover newsgathering techniques used by ABC.' °
The Food Lion jury punished the use of deception by ABC in
obtaining the story. Notably, the Food Lion jurors reached their
$5.5 million verdict without considering the propriety of the use of
hidden cameras.'0 1 Instead, the Food Lion jury focused on the
fact that the reporters had lied about their identities and experienc-
es in order to gain employment with Food Lion. °2 Some of the
Food Lion jurors felt that this form of deceit transgressed the




99. See Page, supra note 93, at A15 (discussing a tavern set up by the media which
caught city inspectors inviting and accepting bribes).
100. See Scott Andron, National Survey Says Americans Side with ABC, Not Food Lion,
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Feb. 17, 1997, at B4. This survey was conducted between
January 28 and February 6, 1997. See id. Of the 1001 adults surveyed, 51% said that they
had heard of the case and 52% of those who had heard of the case supported ABC. See id.
59% of all respondents thought that $5.5 million was "too severe" a penalty and 23% of
respondents said that the verdict was "about right." Id. Seven percent said the verdict
"wasn't enough." Id.
101. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 12. In fact, each of the Food Lion jurors told Diane
Sawyer that they felt that the press may justifiably use hidden cameras in some situations.
See id. Five members of the Food Lion jury felt that hidden cameras were justified in that
case; three did not. See id.
102. See id.
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Lion jury foreman Gregory Mack told Chris Salutto of the
Philadelphia Inquirer, "there are boundaries.
10 3
B. The Development of Newsgathering Torts
The term, "newsgathering torts" refers generally to tort claims
in which plaintiffs sue the press for damages incurred as a result of
the newsgathering process."°  Newsgathering tort claims often,
but do not always, accompany claims for publication damages.0 5
Additionally, newsgathering tort claims provide alternative theories
by which targets of investigative reports can seek redress against
the press without alleging libel."0 6 Recurring claims include
invasion of privacy,10 7 trespass,0 8 and interference with contrac-
tual relationship. 9
103. Chris Salutto, Food Lion Jury Did a Good Job, printed in GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, Feb. 3., 1997 at A9.
104. The most frequently cited newsgathering tort cases involve the publication of
confidential information, see, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), or prior restraint, see, e.g., New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). These cases are distinguishable from the
cases discussed in this section because the tort claims in these cases involve-at least in
part-the content of the publication. Because this paper focuses on the tactical side of
newsgathering torts, this section will avoid discussion of some of these more famous
newsgathering cases.
105. See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345,1347 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("The suit is for trespass, defamation, and other torts arising out of the production
and broadcast of a program segment of PrimeTime Live that was highly critical of [the
plaintiffs]."); see also James C. Goodale, Outline For Tortious Interference, 446 PLI/PAT 495,
497 (1996) (referring to use of interference with contract claims as an "add-on" to libel
cases).
For discussion of general trends in newsgathering torts, see generally James C.
Goodale, Non-traditional Forms of Editorial Liability, 447 PLI/PAT 451 (1996); Paul A.
Lebel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward A First Amendment Protection
from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145
(1996).
106. See Jane Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting The Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1069, 1078 (1996).
107. An invasion of privacy is: "The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's
personalty, publicizing one's private affairs with which public has no legitimate concern, or
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such a manner as to cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to person of shorter sensibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (6th
ed. 1990).
108. Trespass is: "An unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights. At
common law, trespass was a form of action brought to recover damages for any injury to
one's person or property or relationship with another. Any unauthorized intrusion or
invasion of private premises or land of another." Id. at 1502.
109. "This tort has four elements: existence of a valid contract, defendant's knowledge
of that contract, defendant's intentional procuring of breach of that contract and damages"
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The rapidly increasing number of newsgathering tort claims has
sparked a lively debate over how far-if at all-the First Amend-
ment should protect the press from tort liability."n Newsgath-
ering tort plaintiffs, as well as critics of First Amendment protec-
tion for newsgathering, contend that the freedom of the press does
not give the media a "license to trespass,"'' n  and cite the often
quoted maxim that the press is not immune from general liabili-
ty."l2 By contrast, proponents of First Amendment protection for
newsgathering often cite investigative reporting's distinguished
history as proof of newsgathering's value to the freedom of the
press.
C. Unlimited Liability
Because tort law is governed by the laws of the several states,
newsgathering tort claims differ widely among jurisdictions. The
varying elements of each individual tort claim make comparison of
these cases difficult. The striking differences between newsgather-
ing tort cases is. apparent when Food Lion's $5.5 million jury award
is compared with two other cases involving PrimeTime Live. These
three cases involve similar issues, similar allegedly tortious actions,
and the same defendants. The three verdicts were delivered within
two years of one another. Yet because these cases were tried
under tort law theories in different states, these cases produced
very different results.
Food Lion involved two undercover reporters who posed as
employees to obtain information for a news story.1"' While
Id. at 814; see also Jennifier Falk Weiss, Newsgathering Torts and Breach of Contract Claims,
446 PLI/PAT 485 (1996).
110. See, e.g., PrimeTime Live, supra note 12; Lebel, supra note 105; Robert M. O'Neil,
Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1005 (1996); John J. Walsh, et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for the Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111 (1996); Lori Keeton, Note: What is Really Rotten in the
Food Lion Case, Chilling the Media's Newsgathering Techniques, 40 FLA. L. REV. III (1997);
Punitive Award In Food Lion Case Puts Chill on Press Freedom, BROWARD DAILY
BUSINESS REVIEW, at A2.
111. Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The First Amendment
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed
during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to
steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of Another's home or office.")
112. See id.
113. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 816 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
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employed by Food Lion, the reporters used hidden cameras and
audio recording devices to gather news.114 The jury found the
reporters were guilty of fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty under
North Carolina law.'
15
By contrast, ABC was not liable of either trespass or fraud
after it was sued on similar facts in Illinois. In Desnick v. ABC,"'
ABC sent undercover reporters, disguised as patients, to investigate
an optometrist reputed for unethical practices." 7 Desnick sued
ABC for trespass, 18 fraud,'19 invasion of privacy,2 ° and viola-
tion of wire tapping statutes.121 Each of these claims failed under
state tort law.
122
The Desnick Court criticized the plaintiffs' fraud claim. 23
The plaintiffs alleged that ABC had committed fraud by agreeing
to interview Desnick without sending any undercover reporters into
Desnick's office. 124  Instead, ABC sent undercover reporters into
offices affiliated with Desnick in other states.125  Writing for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Chief
Judge Richard Posner stated:
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
117. See id. at 1348.
118. See id. at 1351 (Under Illinois law, trespass is "[t]o enter upon another's land
without consent").
119. See id. at 1354 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that ABC committed fraud by
gaining access to the plaintiffs's office by falsely promising that they would present a fair
picture of the Center's operations and would not use undercover tactics). The trial court had
sustained the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim on these grounds, but the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed that claim in order to appeal the trial court's dismissal of the other
claims. See id.
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353 (noting plaintiffs' allegation that ABC violated both
federal and Wisconsin statutes regulating electronic surveillance).
122. See id. at 1351-54. In addressing the plaintiffs' claim of trespass, the court rejected
the argument that the fraud by the defendants in gaining access negated the plaintiffs'
consent. See id. at 1351. The court also rejected the claim of invasion of privacy, ruling that
"no intimate personal facts concerning the two individual plaintiffs ... were revealed." Id.
at 1353. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that by recording the conversations ABC
violated federal and state wiretapping statutes because the plaintiff could not show that the
purpose of the recording was to commit a crime, tort, or other "injurious acts." See id.
Finally, the court rejected the fraud claim because the plaintiffs could not show that the false
promises were part of a "scheme" to defraud. See id. at 1354.
123. See id. at 1354-55.
124. See id. at 1354.
125. See id.
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Investigative journalists well known for ruthlesness promise to
wear kid gloves. They break their promise, as any person of
normal sophistication would expect. If that is "fraud," it is the
kind against which potential victims can easily arm themselves
by maintaining a minimum of skepticism about journalistic goals
and methods .... No legal remedies to protect [Desnick] from
what happened are required, or by Illinois law provided.
126
Recently, ABC likewise prevailed in an invasion of privacy
suite in California. In Sanders v. ABC,'27 a California appellate
court reversed a $1.2 million judgement awarded to the director of
a tele-psychic business.128  Like Food Lion and Desnick, Sanders
involved an undercover reporter using a false identity to gather
news.129  The reporter posed as an employee of a tele-psychic
business in order to obtain hidden video camera footage for a
PrimeTime Live story. 3 The Sanders court held that ABC was
not liable for invasion of privacy because the jury found that the
plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy, an essential
element of an invasion of privacy claim.131
The Sanders, Desnick, and Food Lion cases share some
similarities as well as differences. One common factor between
these cases is the courts' inability to define the proper place for
newsgathering under the First Amendment. 32 Even when the
press has defeated liability for newsgathering, courts have shown
reluctance to offer First Amendment grounds for their decisions.
The trial court in the Desnick case, for example, did not even
address the freedom of the press issue.'33 Judge Posner's Desnick
opinion addresses the First Amendment, but only after each claim
had been dismissed on tort grounds.'34
126. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1354.
127. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
128. See id. at 596.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. The Sanders court held that a plaintiff alleging invasion of privacy under
California law must establish three things: "(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant
constituting a serious invasion of privacy." Id. (emphasis in original).
132. See Walsh et al., supra note 110, at 1123-24 (noting that courts are split over whether
to balance First Amendment interest against newsgathering trespass claims, but that most
courts reject First Amendment considerations).
133. Desnick v. ABC, 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
134. Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Similarly, the Sanders Court recognized the lawsuit's potential
First Amendment implications,135 but did not address the issue
because it resolved the case entirely on tort grounds. Furthermore,
the Sanders majority indicated that it might have found liability if
the plaintiff had presented a trespass or fraud claim to the jury;36
this statement indicates that the First Amendment would not have
shielded the press from liability had the proper tort theory been
raised. Thus, although the Sanders decision has been hailed as a
vindication of ABC's undercover reporting style,137 the decision
fails to add any substance to newsgathering protection under the
First Amendment.
The differences between the Desnick, Sanders, and Food Lion
verdicts demonstrate the problem created by a lack of uniform
limits for newsgathering tort liability. The facts of each case are
substantially the same; yet, because tort law varies between states,
these three cases yielded three different results.
The discrepancies among these cases could be resolved by a
broader understanding of the importance of newsgathering under
the First Amendment. Unfortunately, courts remain uncertain of
where to place newsgathering within a constitutional scheme. To
reconcile the conflict between the freedom of the press and tort
liability, courts must move beyond vague statements acknowledging
the importance of a free press,'38 and establish outer limits for
newsgathering liability upon which both the media and the general
public can rely.
D. Circumventing Sullivan
Newsgathering tort cases substitute for libel actions when a
plaintiff cannot establish the proof required by the Sullivan
135. Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597 ("[W]e note the case implicates First Amendment
freedom of the press issues, resolution of which requires care lest we improperly restrict
press freedom.") (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1965)).
136. See id. at 598 ("[W]e decline to extend tort protection under an invasion of privacy,
as opposed to a trespass or fraud, cause of action, to those secretly photographed who lack
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy ... ").
137. See John Carmody, WASHINGTON POST, 'PrimeTime' Takes On Hidden-Camera
Issue, Feb. 5, 1997, at C5 ("ABC News President Roone Arledge said Monday that the new
ruling 'is a vindication of our belief that hidden cameras and undercover reporting can be
important and legal tools of investigative journalism."').
138. See, e.g., Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355; Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
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test.'39 Both proponents and critics of newsgathering tort liability
have noted that newsgathering torts do in fact, and are often
intended to, serve this function.14 ° Proponents of newsgathering
tort liability argue that this is a method by which to regulate media
conduct. t4 ' Ironically, critics of newsgathering tort liability agree:
Newsgathering torts substitute for libel claims when a plaintiff fails
to meet the Sullivan test, and are therefore unconstitutional under
the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell.'42
In Falwell, the Court held that a public figure cannot recover
for reputation damages caused by a lawful publication without
proving libel.t43  In that case, the Reverend Jerry Falwell"
sued Hustler Magazine for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress after the magazine featured a
satirical interview that depicted Falwell describing an incestuous
affair with his mother.'45 Falwell failed to prove invasion of
privacy or libel at trial, but prevailed on the emotional distress
claim.'46 The United States Supreme Court held that Falwell
could not recover for emotional distress damages caused by the
publication which he failed to prove was libelous. 47
139. See George Freeman et al., '60 Minutes' and the Law "Can Journalists Be Liable for
Tortious Interference With Contract?, 68-AUG N.Y. St. B.J. 24, 28 (1997). The authors state:
For most of this century, plaintiffs have sought to employ tort theories other than
defamation in their efforts to halt, or to obtain redress for harm done to them by,
press publication. Their obvious purpose has been to evade the common-law and
constitutional hurdles that protect the press from actions for libel.
Id.
140. See Walsh et al., supra note 110, at 1133-34 (noting that the ninth circuit, in Diete-
mann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), based it's reinstatement of the trial court's
damage award solely upon harm caused by publication); but see, Kirtley, supra note 106, at
1080 (noting that newsgathering tort claims have become a means for corporate plaintiffs to
attack and discourage unfavorable news reporting).
141. See Walsh et al., supra note 110, at 1134-35 (suggesting that the media forfeit their
First Amendment rights when they transgress civil or criminal laws in the course of
newsgathering.
142. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
143. See id. at 56.
144. Falwell is considered a public figure under the doctrine set forth in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) and was therefore held to the heightened standard of proof
required by the Sullivan test. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51-52.
145. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47-48.
146. See id. at 49
147. See id. at 56.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The Falwell Court reaffirmed the value of "the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public importance," '148 and
recognized that political cartoons and satires are designed to
contribute to public debate.149 The Court noted that political
cartoons and satires are sometimes caustic in nature, and often are
intended to injure or embarrass their subjects.150 Nonetheless, the
Court noted that political cartoons and satires have historically
"played a prominent role in public and political debate," and are
therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.'
The Falwell Court recognized that the cause of Falwell's
emotional distress was the lawful publication of the satire.152 The
Court, however, would not allow Falwell to recover damages for
the lawful publication because he did not prove libel: "Were we to
hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists
and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any
showing that their work falsely defamed its subject." '153
The Falwell holding signaled-at least in emotional distress
cases-that the United States Supreme Court is not willing to let
plaintiffs circumvent the Sullivan test merely by alleging a tort
theory other than libel. In a later opinion, the Court reflected on
Falwell as a case in which the plaintiff "[attempted] to use an
emotional distress theory to avoid the strict requirements for
establishing a libel or defamation claim.' ' 154  In Desnick, Judge
Posner comments upon the Falwell case and plaintiffs' attempts to
substitute newsgathering tort claims for libel:
Today's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage,
conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an increasingly
competitive television market .... constitutes-although it is
often shrill, one-sided, and offensive, and sometimes defamato-
ry-an important part of that market. It is entitled to all the
safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded
148. Id. at 50.
149. See id. at 54.
150. See Falwell. 485 U.S. at 54.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 55.
153. Id. at 53.
154. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,671 (1991) (Nor is [the plaintiff] attempt-
ing to use a[n alternative tort theory] to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel
or defamation claim .... Thus, this is not a case like Hustler Magazine..., where we held
that the constitutional libel standards apply to a claim alleging that the publication of a
parody was a state-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
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liability for defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of
the name of the tort, . . . , and we add, regardless of whether
the aimed at the content of the broadcast or the production of
the broadcast.155
Following the Falwell analysis, the Food Lion court attempted
to prohibit those of Food Lion's claims that were based on
publication damages.156 Because Food Lion did not allege that
the publication was libelous, the Food Lion court instructed the
jury not to award damages for harm to Food Lion's reputation
caused by the broadcast.157 However, relying on Cohen v. Cowels
Media Co.,58 the Food Lion Court did not bar any of Food
Lion's claims that were based on actual damages. 59
The distinction between publication and actual damages
apparently confused at least one of the Food Lion jurors. 6 °
Although ABC had only caused Food Lion $1402 in actual
damages, the jury determined that the actions of ABC were
wrongful enough to warrant a $5.5 million punitive damage award.
At least one juror justified her verdict on the damages caused by
the publication: "[ABC] hurt Food Lion. They lost money.""16
Thus, while protecting publication is an essential and well-estab-
lished function of the First Amendment, publication can still be
punished where newsgathering is subject to unlimited liability.
IV. Punitive Damages and The Press
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines punitive damages
as "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.' ' 16 2 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,'63 the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that punitive damages serve a
155. Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
156. See Food Lion, Inc. v Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822 (N.D.N.C.
1995) (deciding that the case followed Cohen and that press was not immune from generally
applicable law). But see id. (accepting ABC's argument that Food Lion could not recover
for reputational damages under Supreme Court's analysis in Falwell).
157. See id. at 822.
158. 501 U.S. 663.
159. See Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 821.
160. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 12.
161. Id.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
163. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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legitimate state interest in punishing and deterring tortious
conduct.' 64 Other rationales supporting punitive damage awards
have included vindicating hurt feelings, financing litigation costs in
which small compensatory awards are expected, and satiating a
plaintiff's desire for revenge.1
65
A. Unjustifiable Burden
Punitive damages present special problems when applied to the
press. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,166 the United States Su-
preme Court held that awarding punitive damages for libel when
the plaintiff is not required to prove actual malice may impose an
unjustifiable burden on the press. 167  While a state has a legiti-
mate interest in deterring and punishing tortious conduct,168 this
interest must be balanced against the First Amendment where a
plaintiff seeks recovery for damages caused by publication.
69
When a libel plaintiff does not establish actual malice, the First
Amendment interests in freedom of speech and press override the
state interest in punishing and deterring tortious conduct.17°
The Gertz Court held that punitive damages may not be
awarded to a private individual who establishes libel without
proving actual malice.' 7 ' The Court noted that punitive awards
are unpredictable and often result in amounts bearing no reason-
able relation to actual damages.' Furthermore, allowing a jury
to award punitive damages for libel would give the jury a tool by
which to punish unpopular views.'73
Finally, the Gertz Court found no legitimate state interest in
awarding punitive damages in a libel action when the plaintiff does
164. See id. at 568.
165. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2nd Cir. 1967).
166. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
167. See id. at 349-50.
168. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
169. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. ("We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a
competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment.").
170. See id. at 349.
171. See id. at 350.
172. See id. at 350 ("In most jurisdictions, jury discretion over the amounts awarded is
limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess
punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the
actual harm caused.").




not prove actual malice.174 The Court held that punitive damages
are "wholly irrelevant" to the state interest justifying the exception
to the Sullivan test in a libel suit by a private individual-compen-
sating a private individual for unjustified reputational injury.75
The Court noted that punitive damages "are not compensation for
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil jurors to
punish reprehensible conduct and deter its future occurrence." '176
For these reasons, the Court determined that allowing juries to
award punitive damages in these cases "unnecessarily exacerbates
the danger of media self-censorship."' 77
In his dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,178 Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that punitive damages
unjustifiably magnify the threat of media self-censorship and should
be forbidden in all libel cases.17 9 Justice Marshall argued that a
fear of a potential punitive damage award would dampen a
publisher's incentive to seek out news and therefore constrain the
vigorous exercise of the press. 8 ' Like the Gertz majority, Justice
Marshall argued that a jury's unlimited discretion would allow a
jury to sanction unorthodoxy.18' Furthermore, punitive damages
remove all reasonable predictors of potential liability.182 Fear of
such arbitrary and unpredictable damage awards, Justice Marshall
argued, would directly and fundamentally threaten the free exercise
of the press.'83
B. Constitutional Implications of Punitive Damages
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,"8 the United States
Supreme Court held that, because punitive damages awards are
disciplinary in nature, punitive damages awards must comport with
174. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
175. Id. ("[P]unitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a
negligence standard for private defamation actions.").
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 84.
180. See id. at 81.
181. See id. (differing with the Gertz majority, however, in that the Gertz holding would
apparently allow punitive damages in cases in which malice is proven; Justice Marshall's
opinion would not.)
182. See id.
183. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 81.
184. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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constitutional standards. 185  The BMW Court recognized that
most states give juries a significant amount of latitude in determin-
ing punitive damages awards.186  However, the Court held that
where punitive damages awards are "grossly excessive," in relation
to a state's interest in punishing and deterring wrongful conduct,
they "enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
187
The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution entitles a
defendant to receive fair notice that his conduct may subject him
to punishment as well as notice of potential severity of that
punishment.188 Because juries have virtually unlimited discretion
in awarding punitive damages awards, these awards run the risk of
violating this fair notice requirement.189 Therefore, the state
interest in applying punitive damages awards must be balanced
against factors indicating whether the defendant had sufficient
notice of the potential sanction that its conduct might attract. 190
Punitive damages awards which are "grossly excessive" in relation
to the state interest in applying the award violate a defendant's
Due Process right to fair notice of the potential sanction imposed
upon him.191
C. Competing Interests
The Court's analysis in BMW of whether an award is "grossly
excessive" lends greater insight to the propriety of awarding
punitive damages in the newsgathering context. To determine
whether a punitive damage award was "grossly excessive," the
Court first examined the state interest involved in enforcing the
punitive damage award. 92 Punitive damages awards, like criminal
sanctions,'93 serve the state interest of punishing and deterring
wrongful conduct a94 This state interest must then be balanced
185. See id. at 568.
186. See id.
187. Id.; see also U.S CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
188. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
189. See id. at 575.
190. See id. at 574-75.
191. Id. at 568.
192. See id. at 568-74.
193. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing.)
194. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
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against factors indicating whether the defendant had sufficient
notice of the penalty that his actions might attract. 195 These
factors are: the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct,196 the ratio of the punitive award to the amount of
compensatory damages established 97 and criminal or civil sanc-
tions that could lawfully be imposed for similar misconduct.
198
The first factor indicating whether a defendant had notice of
the potential punitive damages award that may be imposed upon
him is the "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's con-
duct. 99  In determining the degree of reprehensibility of an
offense, a jury may consider both the severity of the act and the
defendant's motive. °° Punitive damages awards are generally
awarded for wrongful actions that are considered "outrageous,
211
or "egregiously improper., 20 2  As the BMW Court noted, these
factors reflect the principle that "some wrongs are more wrong than
others.
213
The degree of reprehensibility of newsgathering torts will
generally be very low. "In any foreseeable media case [the actor's]
motive presumably is to inform the public.''204  As the United
States Supreme Court has recognized, the media serves as the
"surrogate of the people" in gaining access to otherwise unacces-
sible information. 25 Thus, the media serves the important public
function of "informing the public about the behavior of others, in
affecting the conduct of public officials, and in deterring wrongful
conduct by both public officials and private figures.,' 206  Judge
Posner adopted this view in the Desnick case when he dismissed
195. See id. at 574.
196. See id. at 575.
197. See id. The court noted that "exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relation-
ship' to compensatory damages .... " Id. at 580.
198. See id.
199. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
200. See id. ("Thus we have said that 'nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes
marked by violence or threat of violence." and "'trickery and deceit' .. are more
reprehensible than negligence.") (citations omitted).
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may
be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the right of others.")
202. BMW, 517 U.S. at 580.
203. Id. at 575.
204. Freeman, et al., supra note 139, at 25.
205. See supra note 86.
206. Lebel, supra note 105, at 1153.
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the claim that ABC reporters had acted with a 'fraudulent scheme'
when the reporters disguised themselves as patients in order to
uncover Desnick's unethical medical practices.2 °7 Judge Posner
noted that "[t]he only scheme here was a scheme to expose publicly
any bad practices that the investigative team discovered, and that
is not a fraudulent scheme."2 8
The second factor that determines whether a punitive damages
award is "grossly excessive" is the ratio of the award to the amount
of actual damages that the defendant's actions caused or could
likely have caused to the plaintiff.20 9 In BMW, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a punitive damages award that was 500
times the amount of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.21°
Although the Court refused to establish a mathematical formula to
determine the constitutional limits of punitive damages awards in
relation to actual damages, the Court pointed out that punitive
damages awards of four to ten times the amount of actual damages
had bordered on the limits of constitutionally accepted awards in
past cases."' The court concluded that "[w]hen the ratio is a
breathtaking 500 to 1, however, the award must surely 'raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow.""'2 2
When newsgathering torts are used as a substitute for libel
actions, punitive damages awards will often "raise a suspicious
judicial eyebrow." This will be the case because damages for
newsgathering torts are often only nominal. In the Food Lion case,
for example, the ratio of the punitive damages award to the actual
damages established at trial was over 3300 to 1.213 Even after the
remittitur of damages, the ratio of punitive to actual damages
remains at 250 to 1.214
207. See Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
208. Id.
209. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).
210. See id. at 582.
211. See id. at 581.
212. Id. at 583 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
213.




Finally, the BMW court looked to whether criminal or civil
sanctions could be imposed for similar conduct.215 This point
weighs neither for nor against the press, but instead brings us back
to the need for uniform limits of newsgathering liability. As the
Desnick, Sanders, and Food Lion cases show, the same newsgather-
ing practices that resulted in defense verdicts in Illinois and
California subjected ABC to a $5.5 million judgement in North
Carolina.216
States have a legitimate interest in punishing and deterring
tortious conduct.217 However, when a state interest interferes
with a constitutionally protected right, the state interest must be
balanced against that right. In Gertz for example, the United
States Supreme Court held that the state's legitimate interest in
compensating a private individual for defamation must be balanced
against the "constitutional command of the First Amendment.,
218
Thus, although a state has a legitimate interest in punishing and
deterring wrongful conduct, this interest must not extend so far as
to impose an unjustifiable burden on the press.
219
V. Conclusion
"The modem history of the guarantee of freedom of speech and
press mainly has been one of a search for the outer limits of
that right.
21
Justice Marshall concluded his Rosenbloom dissent by
proposing that the threat to the free press posed by punitive
damages can be eliminated by restricting recovery in libel cases to
compensatory damages. 22 This limitation on damages would
serve the same underlying interest that exists in awarding punitive
damages, that is, protecting individuals from defamation, while
215. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583-85.
216. Compare Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 887 F. Supp. 811, and Lebel, supra
note 105, with Desnick 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995), and Sanders v. ABC, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
217. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
218. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1973).
219. See id.
220. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967).
221. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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eliminating the risk of media self-censorship. Justice Marshall
concluded, furthermore, that requiring a defendant to pay for
actual damages would sufficiently serve the public interest in
deterring future defamatory behavior.222
Actual damages for newsgathering liability serve a significant
deterrent function. When a reporter knows that there is a risk of
liability when pursuing a particular line of investigation, that
reporter will be forced to make a careful determination of whether
the cost is worth the benefit. Thus, it could not be said that the
press is using the First Amendment as a license to "invade the
rights and liberties of others.,
223
The national scope of today's media requires a more uniform
-or at least predictable-standard for liability. The judiciary's
failure to limit newsgathering liability under the First Amendment
has resulted in unpredictable results in different jurisdictions.
While media lawyers may seek assistance from practitioners guides
to advise them of a particular jurisdiction's laws, 224 media lawyers
have not been able to accurately predict newsgathering liability.
225
Finally, states have little interest in applying punitive damages
when the press incurs liability in the course of newsgathering.
Punitive damages serve the state interest of punishing and deterring
wrongful conduct. However, when liability is incurred in the course
of newsgathering, and the press is serving the public function of
disseminating information, this interest does not apply.
Twenty-five years after the Supreme Court reassured the
media that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment
protection, 226 the Court has yet to define the constitutional status
of newsgathering. Once newsgathering receives protection under
the First Amendment, beyond the ephemeral language in previous
United States Supreme Court opinions, a fair and adequate
balancing test may be applied to determine when tort liability is
appropriate for harm caused by newsgathering. Until then, the risk
222. See id.
223. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
224. See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Non-Traditional Forms of Editorial Liability, 447
PLI/Pat 451 (1996).
225. See PrimeTime Live, supra note 12 (noting that ABC's lawyers research the laws of
each jurisdiction its reporters enter to "check for legality").
226. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
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of media self-censorship will continue to grow as freedom of
information is sacrificed to state interests in general tort liabil-
ity.
22 7
227. Judicial unwillingness to limit newsgathering liability has already had some discom-
forting chilling effects on the freedom of the press. In November 1995, CBS canceled a
scheduled interview with a former employee of a tobacco company, Brown & Williamson,
because it feared liability. See George Freeman et al., supra note 139, at 24; James C.
Goodale, '60 Minutes' V. CBS and Vice Versa, 12/1/95 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (1995). CBS was
not concerned with any potential libel action; apparently, the network feared liability under
an interference with contract tort theory. See id. Thus, the protections of the Sullivan test
were of little help to the freedom of the press where CBS feared it would be sanctioned for
newsgathering torts.

